000			01804cam a2200241 a 4500
005			20241210103118.0
008			070608s2008 nyua b 001 0 eng
020			_a9788130915999
040			_aRCL
082	0	0	_a519.3 W28S
100	1		_aWatson, Joel. _925260
245	1	0	_aStrategy : _bAn Introduction to Game Theory _c/Joel Watson.
250			_a2nd ed.
260			_aNew Delhi : _bViva Books, _c2020.
300			_axvii, 404p. ; 23cm. _bill. ;
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aThe extensive form -- Strategies and the normal form -- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs -- General assumptions and methodology -- Dominance and best response -- Rationalizability and iterated dominance -- Location and partnership -- Nash equilibrium -- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting -- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium -- Strictly competitive games and security strategies -- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings -- Details of the extensive form -- Backward induction and subgame perfection -- Topics in industrial organization -- Parlor games -- Bargaining problems -- Analysis of simple bargaining games -- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium -- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership -- Repeated games and reputation -- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill -- Random events and incomplete information -- Risk and incentives in contracting -- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability -- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation -- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium -- Job-market signaling and reputation.
650		0	_aGame theory. _925261
650		0	_aEconomics
650		0	_aStrategic planning. _925262
856	4	1	_uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0720/2007024031.html
942			_cBK
999			_c46121 _d46121